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Why aren’t banks lending more? The role of commercial  
real estate
by Sumit Agarwal, senior financial economist, Hesna Genay, senior economist and research advisor, and Robert McMenamin, 
senior associate economist
Since August 2007, the U.S. and global financial markets have endured the worst crisis 
since the Great Depression, accompanied by a deep economic recession. At the height 
of the crisis, whole segments of financial markets froze and market participants hesitated 
to engage in transactions with even the most creditworthy counterparties. 
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1.  Average quarterly growth rate of non-CRE loans
Note: CRE indicates commercial real estate. 
Source: Call Reports.








































































2002­to­$230­billion­in­2007.­However,­  2. Bank characteristics as of 2003:Q2
NoteS: Commercial real estate (CRE) concentration type is defined as the top 30% (high), 30-69% (mid), and bottom 
30% (low) of lenders based on 2007:Q2 levels of CRE lending as a share of total assets. Values reported are the median 
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3. Non-CRE loan growth, controlling for bank characteristics
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Pre-crisis period Crisis period
of­the­crisis.­Moreover,­compared­with­
low-CRE­banks,­high-CRE­banks­are,­on­
average,­larger;­devote­a­greater­percent-
age­of­their­assets­to­loans­and­a­smaller­
percentage­to­securities;­lend­more­to­
businesses,­but­less­to­consumers;­have­
higher­loan-loss­allowances,­but­lower­
loan­delinquencies­as­a­percentage­of­
assets;­and­have­lower­Tier­1­capital­ra-
tios.4­However,­there­is­no­noticeable­
difference­between­banks­with­different­
CRE­concentrations­in­terms­of­the­frac-
tion­of­assets­funded­by­deposits.­The­
other­differences­are­statistically­signif-
icant­and­generally­hold­true­in­later­
periods­(as­of­2007:Q2­and­2010:Q2).5­
To­analyze­the­importance­of­these­bank­
characteristics­in­explaining­lending­
behavior,­we­estimate­an­ordinary­least­
squares­regression­of­loan­growth­con-
trolling­for­these­factors.­Specifically,­we­
estimate­a­model­that­captures­the­dif-
ferences­between­the­lending­behavior­
of­mid-­and­high-CRE­banks­over­the­
entire­sample­period­and­that­of­low-
CRE­banks.­We­also­identify­possible­
differences­in­lending­behavior­of­banks­
during­the­post­2008:Q2­period­relative­
to­the­earlier­period­and­relative­to­each­
other.­In­addition,­we­relate­the­quar-
terly­growth­rate­of­non-CRE­loans­to­
bank­size,­Tier­1­capital­ratio,­fraction­
of­assets­funded­by­deposits,­the­ratio­
of­total­loans­to­total­assets,­and­the­ra-
tio­of­delinquent­loans­to­total­loans.­
We­control­for­economic­conditions­by­
including­the­growth­
rate­of­real­gross­do-
mestic­product­(GDP)­
and­changes­in­com-
mercial­real­estate­
prices­in­our­model;­
we­take­into­account­
possible­persistence­in­
loan­growth­by­includ-
ing­four­lags­of­the­
dependent­variable.­
Figure­3­shows­the­es-
timated­growth­rates­of­
non-CRE­lending­at­
low-,­mid-,­and­high-
CRE­banks­after­con-
trolling­for­all­the­
above-mentioned­fac-
tors.6­First,­note­that­
even­after­controlling­
for­bank­characteristics­and­other­fac-
tors,­the­general­patterns­from­figure­1­
still­hold.­That­is,­in­the­pre-crisis­period,­
there­is­a­positive­correlation­between­
the­growth­rate­of­non-CRE­lending­and­
CRE­exposure.­Moreover,­the­difference­
between­the­lending­behavior­of­high-
CRE­banks­and­that­of­other­banks­
during­the­crisis­becomes­even­starker­
once­we­control­for­bank­characteristics:­
The­average­estimated­growth­rate­of­
non-CRE­loans­at­low-­and­mid-CRE­
banks­in­the­crisis­period­is­positive­and­
around­1%.­Hence,­banks­with­low-­and­
mid-CRE­concentrations­continued­to­
extend­loans­to­other­segments­of­the­
economy­during­the­crisis,­albeit­at­a­
relatively­subdued­pace.­In­contrast,­
banks­with­high­CRE­concentrations­
prior­to­the­crisis­reduced­their­lending­
to­other­segments­of­the­economy­during­
the­crisis,­on­average,­by­0.5­percentage­
points­per­quarter.­These­estimated­
differences­in­the­lending­behavior­of­
banks­with­low-­and­high-CRE­exposure­
levels­cumulate­to­significant­amounts­
over­the­entire­crisis­period.­Specifically,­
we­estimate­that­non-CRE­loans­at­banks­
that­entered­the­crisis­with­low­CRE­ex-
posure­increased­by­more­than­8%­from­
the­second­quarter­of­2008­through­the­
second­quarter­of­2010.­Similarly,­non-
CRE­lending­at­mid-CRE­banks­grew­by­
6.5%­over­the­same­period.­In­contrast,­
high-CRE­banks­reduced­their­lending­
to­non-CRE­sectors­by­4%­cumulatively.7­
In­dollar­terms,­these­percentage­changes­
translate­to­a­nearly­$82­billion­cumulative­
increase­in­non-CRE­loans­at­low-­and­
mid-CRE­banks­(combined)­during­the­
crisis­and­about­a­$15­billion­dollar­decline­
in­non-CRE­loans­at­high-CRE­banks.­
Turning­to­the­other­factors­we­include­
in­our­analysis,­bank­size­is­positively­and­
significantly­correlated­with­growth­in­
non-CRE­lending.­In­addition,­banks­
with­higher­Tier­1­capital­ratios­and­
lower­loan­delinquency­rates­had­faster­
loan­growth,­consistent­with­previous­
evidence­on­the­effects­of­higher­capi-
talization­and­higher­credit­quality­on­
loan­growth.­Higher­real­GDP­growth­
and­greater­appreciation­in­commercial­
real­estate­prices­are­also­associated­with­
significantly­higher­loan­growth­at­all­
banks,­again­consistent­with­our­expec-
tations­and­previous­evidence.­Moreover,­
loan­growth­is­highly­persistent.­Faster­
loan­growth­in­one­period­is­associated­
with­significantly­higher­loan­growth­
in­subsequent­periods.­We­found­no­
statistically­significant­relationship­be-
tween­non-CRE­loan­growth­and­the­
propensity­to­fund­assets­with­deposits.­
On­the­other­hand,­banks­that­have­
higher­loan-to-asset­ratios­have­lower­loan­growth­in­subsequent­periods­for­
all­non-CRE­loans.8
Conclusion
Over­the­past­three­years,­global­financial­
markets­have­undergone­extreme­stress.­
Today,­most­financial­market­segments­
have­stabilized­and­are­operating­under­
near-normal­conditions.­However,­loan­
growth­at­commercial­banks­has­yet­to­
resume­after­a­large­contraction­during­
the­crisis.­There­are­numerous­reasons­
for­the­lack­of­loan­growth­at­commer-
cial­banks.­In­this­article,­we­focus­on­
one­possible­factor:­whether­the­large­
CRE­exposure­of­some­banks­prior­to­
the­crisis­and­the­severe­contraction­in­
CRE­markets­during­the­crisis­adversely­
affected­banks’­willingness­or­ability­to­
extend­loans­to­other­sectors­of­the­
economy.­At­first­glance,­higher­CRE­
concentrations­prior­to­the­crisis­appear­
to­be­associated­with­much­slower­loan­
growth­to­other­sectors­during­the­crisis.­
However,­a­portion­of­the­differences­in­
lending­behavior­of­high-,­mid-,­and­
low-CRE­banks­can­be­explained­by­other­
bank­characteristics,­the­economic­en-
vironment,­and­the­dynamics­of­loan­
growth.­Nonetheless,­even­after­con-
trolling­for­these­factors,­we­find­that­
banks­with­high-CRE­concentrations­prior­
to­the­crisis­reduced­their­lending­to­other­
segments­of­the­economy,­while­banks­
with­lower­CRE­exposure­continued­to­
expand­such­lending.­
1­­We­also­examined­the­growth­rates­of­
commercial­and­industrial­(C&I)­loans­at­
banks­with­different­CRE­exposure­levels.­
The­results­for­C&I­lending­were­similar­
to­those­reported­here.
2­­These­numbers­reflect­changes­in­the­
Moody’s­Real­Commercial­Property­Index­
(obtained­from­Haver­Analytics),­which­is­
designed­to­measure­price­changes­in­repeat­
transactions­of­commercial­properties.
3­­CRE­Financial­Council,­2010,­Compendium of 
Statistics,­October,­available­at:­
www.crefc.org/uploadedFiles/CMSA_Site_
Home/Industry_Resources/Research/­
Industry_Statistics/CMSA_Compendium.pdf.­ ­
4­­The­ratio­of­Tier­1­(core)­capital­to­risk-
weighted­assets,­as­defined­by­bank­regulators.
5­­The­differences­between­mid-CRE­and­
high-CRE­banks­are­generally­similar­to­
those­between­low-­and­high-CRE­banks.
6­­The­full­regression­results­are­available­
from­the­authors­upon­request.
7­­The­estimated­differences­between­the­
growth­rates­of­non-CRE­lending­at­high-
CRE­banks­and­those­at­the­other­two­groups­
are­statistically­significant­at­the­1%­level.­
However,­once­we­control­for­other­factors,­
there­is­no­statistically­significant­difference­
in­the­non-CRE­lending­behavior­of­low-­
and­mid-CRE­banks­during­the­crisis.
8­­The­results­we­present­here­are­robust­to­
adjusting­for­the­effects­of­mergers­and­bank­
failures.­We­also­explored­the­possibility­that­
our­model­is­not­the­correct­specification­
to­capture­differences­in­the­characteristics­
of­banks­in­the­three­groups­by­estimating­
a­two-equation­system­that­explicitly­modeled­
the­propensity­to­have­higher­CRE­concen-
trations.­We­obtained­results­similar­to­those­
presented­here.